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 Why is corruption wrong? This Article argues that there are two 
main approaches to conceptualizing the “wrong” of corruption: first, 
corruption as an abuse of power; and second, corruption as 
inequality. In addition, I claim that there is a conceptual 
convergence between these two approaches. As a result, many forms 
of corruption can be framed as either an abuse of power and/or as a 
violation of equality. I show that even quid pro quo corruption can 
be framed in equality terms—a surprising outcome given the 
Supreme Court’s acceptance of quid pro quo corruption and 
rejection of equality-based corruption. 
 This Article also considers Lawrence Lessig’s theory of 
dependence corruption, which does not seem to fit readily in the two 
approaches described above. I suggest, first, that dependence 
corruption is not fully consistent with an originalist understanding 
of corruption, and second, that the “wrong” at issue in dependence 
corruption is ultimately a concern about representation. 
 In addition to developing a conceptual map of corruption, this 
Article also focuses on the theoretical puzzles and challenges posed 
by corruption. For corruption as inequality, I identify seven forms 
that it could take, and I show how some of these forms have 
manifested in the Court’s campaign finance decisions. For 
corruption as the abuse of power, I consider three conceptual 
challenges: the distinction between acceptable and corrupt political 
gain the distinction between the public interest and private interests; 
and the distinction between acceptable and corrupt legislative 
responsiveness. I argue these conceptual challenges make it difficult 
to distinguish corruption from ordinary democratic politics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of corruption is central to the United States Supreme 
Court’s campaign finance decisions, yet despite its significance, the 
meaning of corruption is deeply contested. The Court has offered a 
number of definitions of corruption over the years.1 These definitions 
are not only inconsistent from case to case but they have also given 
rise to considerable disagreements between the majority and dissent 
in individual cases. In Citizens United v. FEC,2 the majority settled on 
a narrow quid pro quo understanding of corruption,3 yet it is not 
completely clear what this quid pro quo approach means, either in 
theory or in practice. Notwithstanding these disagreements, there is 
little doubt that the meaning and scope of the concept of corruption 
has profound consequences for democratic government; indeed, the 
concept of corruption was scrutinized yet again in McCutcheon v. 
FEC.4 
This Article intervenes in this debate by asking the following 
question: Why is corruption wrong? Is there some common activity or 
problem that underlies the different varieties of corruption? Or, to 
put it another way, what is it about the different varieties of 
corruption that make them corrupt? In addition to developing a 
conceptual map of corruption, this Article seeks to shed light on some 
of the deep-seated theoretical difficulties with the concept of 
corruption. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I sets out two main 
approaches to conceptualizing the wrong of corruption. The first 
approach is that corruption amounts to an abuse or misuse of public 
power; that is, it involves the use of public power for private ends. The 
second approach is that corruption violates the principle of political 
equality. In addition, Part I argues that there is a point of convergence 
between corruption as the abuse or misuse of public power and 
corruption as inequality. Because of this conceptual convergence, 
these two strands of corruption are simultaneously present in many of 
the Court’s categories of corruption, including bribery and quid pro 
 
 1.  For a discussion, see Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New 
Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 PENN. L. 
REV. 31, 35–46 (2004). 
 2.  Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 3.  Id. at 909. 
 4.  134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (describing quid pro quo corruption as the only 
constitutional target for campaign finance regulations and detailing activities not considered 
‘corruption’). 
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quo corruption. For this reason, various forms of corruption can be 
framed as both a violation of public power-based arguments and a 
violation of equality-based arguments. 
Part I also considers Lawrence Lessig’s theory of dependence 
corruption, which does not seem to fit readily in either of the two 
categories described above. In a highly influential book, Lessig has 
invited the nation to consider and redress the problem of dependence 
corruption.5 Although I wholeheartedly support Professor Lessig’s 
project to reform the democratic process by addressing corruption, I 
have two observations about dependence corruption as a concept. My 
first claim is that dependence corruption is not fully consistent with 
an originalist understanding of corruption, and my second suggestion 
is that the “wrong” at issue in dependence corruption is ultimately a 
concern about representation. 
Part II turns to quid pro quo corruption. Even though the Court 
makes a distinction between equality-based corruption arguments, 
which it rejects, and quid pro quo corruption arguments, which it 
accepts, I show that both corruption as an abuse or misuse of public 
power and corruption as inequality are the wrongs at issue in quid pro 
quo corruption. 
Part III addresses corruption as inequality, with a particular focus 
on the Supreme Court’s campaign finance decisions. I identify seven 
forms of corruption as inequality, which help to distinguish “anti-
distortion” and “undue influence” understandings of corruption. This 
Part also discusses the doctrinal challenges that result from the Court 
majority’s hostility to equality-based corruption arguments. 
Part IV focuses on corruption as the abuse or misuse of public 
power. I describe three genuinely difficult conceptual problems that 
arise when we conceive of corruption as the use of public power for 
private ends. These problems are: first, the distinction between 
acceptable and corrupt political gain; second, the distinction between 
the public interest and the private interest; and third, the distinction 
between acceptable and corrupt legislative responsiveness. I argue 
that these conceptual challenges make it very difficult to distinguish 
corruption from ordinary democratic politics. 
 
 5.  LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A 
PLAN TO STOP IT (2011).  
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I.  CONCEPTUALIZING CORRUPTION 
Scholars have categorized various kinds of corruption. Thomas 
Burke has distinguished three kinds of corruption: quid pro quo, 
monetary influence, and distortion.6 Zephyr Teachout has identified 
five categories: criminal bribery, inequality, drowned voices, a 
dispirited public, and a lack of integrity.7 Deborah Hellman has 
described three principal kinds of corruption: corruption as the 
deformation of judgment, corruption as the distortion of influence, 
and corruption as the sale of favors.8 
Although there are various approaches in the literature to 
classifying corruption, I argue that there are two general approaches 
to conceptualizing the “wrong” of corruption. The first approach is 
that corruption amounts to an abuse of power. The second approach 
is that corruption violates the principle of political equality. This Part 
also considers Lawrence Lessig’s theory of dependence corruption, 
which offers an alternative approach to understanding corruption. 
A. Corruption as an Abuse of Public Power 
The first approach is that corruption amounts to an abuse or 
misuse of public power. This abuse of power is specifically rooted in 
the use of public power for private ends. When understood as the use 
of public power for private ends, corruption has a long historic 
tradition, one that extends into the current period. As Dennis 
Thompson notes, corruption consists of the “pollution of the public by 
the private.”9 On this view, corruption takes place when public power 
is being used for private gain. Samuel Issacharoff observes that “the 
corruption concern is really a concern with ensuring public—rather 
than private—outputs from the policymaking process”10 A problem 
arises when special interests “seek to capture the power of 
government, not to create public goods, but to realize private gains 
through subversion of state authority.”11 It is important to note that 
this approach—corruption as an abuse of public power—is not 
 
 6.  Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST. 
COMMENT. 127, 131 (1997). 
 7.  Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORN. L. REV. 341, 387 (2009). 
 8.  Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1396–97 (2013). 
 9.  Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for 
Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1038 (2005) [hereinafter Thompson, Concepts]. 
 10.  Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 121 (2010). 
 11.  Id. at 127. 
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necessarily connected to the form of government. For example, we 
may describe a monarchical system of government as corrupt because 
it has degenerated into a tyranny. 
What does the “use of public power for private ends” mean? As 
Zephyr Teachout explains in her seminal work on the anti-corruption 
principle (discussed below),12 this concern about corruption (the use 
of public power for private ends) was at the heart of the republican 
tradition.13 Philip Pettit, who is the leading contemporary theorist of 
the republican tradition, has provided the most extensive theoretical 
treatment of why the use of public power for private ends is wrong.14 
Pettit argues that republican theory is primarily concerned with what 
he calls freedom as non-domination.15 According to Pettit, domination 
is the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in certain choices that 
another person is in a position to make.16 Arbitrariness occurs when 
an agent’s actions are subject only to the will or judgment of the 
agent; that is, the actions are chosen without reference to the interests 
of those affected by the acts.17 
When translated to the level of the state, what is required is that 
the state “is forced to track the common good.”18 In order for state 
action to be non-dominating, Pettit argues that power must be 
exercised in “a way that tracks, not the power-holder’s personal 
welfare or world-view, but rather the welfare and world-view of the 
public.”19 A host of constitutionalist constraints, such as the rule of law 
and the separation of powers prevent the state’s power from being 
used for private ends. The key idea is that, under the republican 
tradition, state actors engage in dominating behavior if they advance 
private interests instead of the common good. 
Pettit’s arguments draw together a long republican tradition that 
includes Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Rousseau.20 
 
 12.  See infra Part I.D. 
 13.  Teachout, supra note 7, at 350–51. 
 14.  This discussion is drawn from Yasmin Dawood, The Anti-Domination Model and the 
Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411 (2008).  
 15.  PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 52 
(1997). 
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id. at 55. 
 18.  Philip Pettit, The Common Good, in JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY 150, 156 (Keith 
Dowding et al, eds., 2004). 
 19.  PETTIT, supra note 15, at 56.  
 20.  See e.g. PETTIT supra, note 15 at ch. 1. (describing and explaining certain contributors 
to the republican tradition). Sources for Pettit’s understanding of the republican tradition 
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Corruption for these philosophers meant the moral incapacity of 
rulers and citizens alike to make reasonably disinterested 
commitments that would benefit the common welfare.21 John Locke’s 
Second Treatise of Government, which had a formative influence on 
the theories of the founding period, likewise warned of the dangers of 
self-serving actions on the part of a ruler.22 For Locke, tyranny 
involves the “use of the Power any one has in his hands; not for the 
good of those, who are under it, but for his own private separate 
Advantage.”23 Power is abused when the ruler’s “Commands and 
Actions are not directed to the preservation of the Properties of his 
People, but the satisfaction of his own Ambition, Revenge, 
Covetousness, or any other irregular Passion.”24 In sum, one approach 
to the wrong of corruption is that it involves an abuse of power, 
understood specifically as the use of public power for private ends. 
B. Corruption as Inequality 
The second reason that corruption is wrong is that it violates the 
principle of political equality.25 This approach is particular to the 
democratic form of government. The democratic form of government 
is premised on the equality of its citizenry—not only an equality 
before the law but also an equal right to participate in the political 
process. As Mark Warren argues, corruption results in “duplicitous 
exclusion” because it excludes those who have a right to be included 
in democratic decision-making, and does so in a manner that cannot 
be publicly justified.26 Citizens are disempowered by corruption 
 
include: Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF THUCYDIDES 
(Robert Crawley, trans., 1934); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Alexander Dunlop Lindsay trans., 
Heron Books 1957); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (trans. Ernest Barker, 1962); Niccolo Machiavelli, 
Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius, in MACHIAVELLI: THE CHIEF WORKS AND 
OTHERS (Allan Gilbert trans., 1965); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourses on Inequality, in 
ROUSSEAU: THE DISCOURSES AND OTHER EARLY POLITICAL WRITING (Victor Gourevich ed., 
1997). 
 21.  See J. Patrick Dobel, The Corruption of a State, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 959, 959–60 
(1978). 
 22.  See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 284 (Peter Laslett, ed., 1960) 
(1690).  
 23.  Id. at 398–99. 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  There is another connection between inequality and corruption, but this connection is 
better thought of as a cause-and-effect relationship. As I argue elsewhere, the divide between 
the rich and the poor, and its connection to the corruption and collapse of the society and the 
government, was a central challenge for the Framers when they devised the institutions of 
republican government. See Yasmin Dawood, The New Inequality: Constitutional Democracy 
and the Problem of Wealth, 67 MD. L. REV. 123, 128 (2007). 
 26.  See, e.g., Mark E. Warren, What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?, 48 AM. J. 
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because they lose the equal opportunity to participate in the process 
through which government outcomes are determined. David Strauss 
argues that corruption is a “derivative problem” because a concern 
about corruption is actually a concern about inequality and the 
dangers of interest group politics in the democratic process.27 He 
writes: “Those who say they are concerned about corruption are 
actually concerned about two other things: inequality and the nature 
of democratic politics. If somehow an appropriate level of equality 
were achieved, much of the reason to be concerned about corruption 
would no longer exist.”28 
There are significant conceptual challenges to defining the equal 
right to participate in the political process. Does it mean an equal 
right to vote? Or does it mean an equal right to influence public 
policy? As discussed in more detail in Part III below, corruption as 
inequality can take many forms. 
C. Convergence between the Power and Equality Conceptions of 
Corruption 
It is also worth noting that a point of convergence emerges 
between corruption as an abuse of power and corruption as 
inequality—but only when discussing corruption in a democracy. This 
point of convergence arises, I suggest, because of the conceptual 
overlap between the ideal forms of the two approaches to corruption. 
As scholars have observed, it is impossible to speak of corruption 
in political life without implicitly referring to an ideal state.29 For 
Thomas Burke, corruption is a “notion that something pure, or 
natural, or ordered has decayed or become degraded.”30 For this 
reason, one cannot use the concept of corruption without “some 
underlying notion of the pure, original or natural state of the body 
politic.”31 A standard of political corruption must therefore “be 
grounded in a convincing theory of representation.”32 In a similar vein, 
Deborah Hellman describes corruption as “derivative” because it 
 
POL. SCI. 328, 333 (2004). 
 27.  David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1369, 1370 (1994). 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Burke, supra note 6, at 128. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
DAWOOD 8.13.14 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/2015  4:37 PM 
110 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 9:1 
“depends on a theory of the institution or official involved.”33 
For corruption as an abuse of power, the ideal at stake is the use 
of public power for the public interest (Ideal 1). For corruption as 
inequality, the ideal at stake is an equal right to participate in the 
political process (Ideal 2). When we say that public power ought to be 
used to forward the public interest (Ideal 1), there is an implicit 
reference to the ideal of equal participation in the political process 
(Ideal 2). This is because our modern conception of the public interest 
tends to be procedural rather than substantive. For philosophers such 
as Rousseau and Locke, there was a “common good” that had a 
substantive content distinct from private ends.34 In our post-Rawlsian 
world, however, we tend to focus on the process by which the public 
interest is determined.35 The procedural approach holds that as long as 
we have a legitimate process then whatever substantive outcome is 
produced will constitute the public interest.36 
What is needed for this process to be legitimate? The process is 
legitimate if it is inclusive of all individuals who will be affected by the 
decision. That is, the process by which the public interest is 
determined is legitimate provided there is a right to equal 
participation in that process. This is, of course, a simplified version of 
the distinction between procedural and substantive accounts of the 
public interest, but the general point is that under a procedural 
approach to determining the public interest, there is an implicit 
baseline of equal participation in that process. 
The implication of the conceptual overlap between Ideal 1 and 
Ideal 2 is that there will also be a conceptual overlap between the 
corrupted versions of these ideals. That is, corruption as inequality and 
corruption as an abuse of power will also have points of convergence. 
Indeed, these points of convergence have long been noted in the 
context of campaign finance regulation. As Stephen Gottlieb 
observes, “corruption is abhorrent because it permits disproportionate 
influence.”37 The corruption argument is thus “a variant on the 
problem of political equality: unequal outlays of political money 
 
 33.  Hellman, supra note 8, at 1389. 
 34.  See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in 2 THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 60 (Victor Gourevitch, ed., 
1997). 
 35.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 73–77 (1971). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Reform, 18 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 213, 229 (1989). 
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create inequality in political representation.”38 
The remainder of this Article will demonstrate how these two 
strands of corruption are simultaneously present in many of the 
Court’s categories of corruption, including quid pro quo corruption 
(discussed in Part II). With respect to corruption an inequality 
(discussed in Part III), a significant challenge is doctrinal as a result of 
the current Court majority’s intolerance for any commitment to 
equality (however defined) in the realm of speech. Corruption as an 
abuse of power raises genuinely difficult conceptual challenges for 
distinguishing between corrupt democratic activity and non-corrupt 
democratic activity (discussed in Part IV). Because of the conceptual 
overlap between the two approaches to corruption, these challenges 
also apply to some forms of corruption as inequality. 
D. Dependence Corruption 
In his landmark book, Lawrence Lessig identifies another form of 
corruption—“dependence corruption.”39 After providing a brief 
description of dependence corruption, this section considers the 
question of why dependence corruption amounts to a form of 
corruption. It canvasses various possibilities including the idea that 
dependence corruption falls into the “corruption as inequality” 
category. Next, this section claims that dependence corruption is not 
fully consistent with an originalist understanding of corruption. 
Finally, this section suggests that the “wrong” at issue in dependence 
corruption is ultimately a concern about representation. 
Dependence corruption arises when a political institution has 
become corrupted “because the pattern of influence operating upon 
individuals within that institution draws them away from the 
influence intended.”40 Lessig claims that dependence corruption is an 
originalist understanding of corruption. According to Lessig, the 
Framers intended for Congress to be “dependent on the people 
alone.”41 This dependence on the people becomes corrupted when 
Congress becomes dependent on another set of political actors, 
namely contributors and lobbyists.42 Dependence corruption does not 
 
 38.  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
663, 679 (1997). 
 39.  LESSIG, supra note 5, at 16. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison). 
 42.  As Guy-Uriel Charles points out, dependence corruption is based on an unstable 
notion of who counts as “the People.” Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Corruption Temptation 120 CALIF. 
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take place via bribery or quid pro quo transactions, but is instead 
rooted in a complex set of relationships and mutual obligations.43 This 
kind of corruption arises as a result of a gift economy based on the 
giving and receiving of political favors.44 Dependence corruption 
operates at the level of the institution; political actors are do not need 
to be corrupt themselves in order for dependence corruption to 
operate.45 
Why is dependence corruption a form of corruption? Lessig 
argues that dependence corruption is distinct from bribery and quid 
pro quo corruption. He also resists the idea that dependence 
corruption amounts to an argument about political equality. For 
instance, Lessig observes that dependence corruption leads to 
distortions in policy because the objectives of donors are most likely 
different than the objectives of the people.46 For this reason, Richard 
Hasen has suggested that the term “dependence corruption” is 
actually referring to “a distortion of policy outcomes, or skew, caused 
by the influence of money, channeled through lobbyists, on politics.”47  
And the Court once found, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce, that large expenditures have “corrosive and distorting 
effects” since they do not necessarily reflect public support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.48  
However, the difficulty with this distortion argument, as Hasen 
points out, is that the Court subsequently rejected Austin–type 
distortion arguments in Citizens United on the grounds that such 
arguments are actually about equality.49 In any event, Hasen notes, 
Lessig himself thinks that Austin was wrongly decided and that 
dependence corruption is not an egalitarian argument.50 According to 
Hasen, the other possibility is that dependence corruption is an anti-
rent seeking interest.51 Although Justice Stevens in his dissenting 
opinion in Citizens United seemed to be favoring an anti-rent seeking 
or national economic welfare rationale for corporate spending limits, 
 
L. REV. 25, 30–32. 
 43.  LESSIG, supra note 5, at 110. 
 44.  Id. at 107, 110. 
 45.  Lawrence Lessig, What An Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 102 
CAL. L. REV 1, 1 (2014) [hereinafter Lessig, Originalist]. 
 46.  LESSIG, supra note 5, at 232–33. 
 47.  Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington, 126 HARV. L. REV. 550, 571 (2012). 
   48.  Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) 
 49.  Id. at 572.  
 50.  Id. (referring to LESSIG, supra note 5, at 240–41). 
 51.  Id. at 574. 
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Hasen is very doubtful that the Court would adopt such a 
justification.52 
In response to Hasen, Lessig argues that distortion is only a 
consequence of the pathology of dependence corruption.53 The 
government suffers from dependence corruption because it “either, 
strictly speaking, has become ‘dependent’ upon an influence other 
than ‘the people,’ or, less strictly, that it has become dependent upon 
an influence that is inconsistent with a dependence upon ‘the 
people.’”54 Lessig writes that politicians are now “dependent upon 
their funders,” who are not the people.55 Without the support of these 
funders, candidates would not be able to run for office.56 In addition, 
this dependence on the funders conflicts with a dependence upon the 
people alone.57 The funders constitute a “tiny slice of the 1%, and that 
dependence plainly conflicts with a ‘dependence on the people 
alone.’”58 
Although I am very much in favor of Lessig’s visionary project to 
tackle corruption in the political process, I query whether dependence 
corruption is fully consistent with an originalist understanding of 
corruption. Lessig’s argument about dependence corruption is based 
on a reading of the Constitution. The idea that the House is supposed 
to be “dependent upon the people alone” is taken from Federalist No. 
52. In addition, Lessig relies on Zephyr Teachout’s highly influential 
work on the anti-corruption principle to make the case that 
dependence corruption is an originalist form of corruption. I think 
there are important aspects of dependence corruption that are 
originalist, in particular the idea that corruption is a systemic 
institutional problem. 
Yet there are two important ways in which Lessig’s account of 
dependence corruption seems to differ from Teachout’s arguments 
about the Framers’ understanding of corruption. The first is that 
Lessig’s definition of dependence corruption seems to exclude the 
central understanding of corruption in the republican tradition—an 
understanding of corruption that is also reflected in Teachout’s 
 
 52.  Id. at 575. 
 53.  Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 61, 64–65 
(2013) [hereinafter Lessig, Reply to Hasen].  
 54.  Id. at 65. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 66. 
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discussion of the influence of that tradition on the Framers. This 
central understanding, shared by republican theorists including the 
Framers, is that corruption consists of the use of public power for 
private ends.59 Second, and relatedly, it seems as though Lessig’s use of 
the concept of “dependence,” while overlapping with Teachout’s use 
of dependency, also differs from it in a significant respect. 
Teachout argues that the anti-corruption principle informs the 
theory, substance and structure of the Constitution.60 The Framers 
were influenced by various thinkers, including Montesquieu and 
Machiavelli, who focused considerable attention on the dangers of 
corruption.61 Several features of the House and Senate were explicitly 
designed to act as a bulwark against corruption.62 The Framers were 
particularly concerned about the corrupting effects of the perks of 
office, which led to the adoption of the Ineligibility Clause, the 
Emoluments Clause, and the Foreign Gifts Clause.63 The division of 
power within government, and the large size of the republic, were also 
thought to protect against corruption.64 
Teachout defines political corruption (as understood by the 
Framers) as the “self-serving use of public power for private ends.”65 
She observes that for the Framers, an “individual is corrupt if he uses 
his public office primarily to serve his own ends.”66 Political corruption 
takes various forms. Teachout identifies four forms of political 
corruption: (1) bribery; (2) public decisions to serve private wealth 
made because of dependent relationships; (3) public decisions to 
serve executive power made because of dependent relationships; and 
(4) the use by public officials of their positions of power to become 
wealthy.67 Teachout’s description of corruption falls squarely within 
the republican tradition.68 
 
 59.  Teachout, supra note 7, at 373–74. 
 60.  Id. at 342–43. 
 61.  Id. at 351. 
 62.  For example, it was considered to be more difficult to “buy, or create dependency, 
across a large body” which meant that the “sheer size and diversity of the House would present 
a formidable obstacle to someone attempting to buy its members.” Id. at 356. 
 63.  Id. at 359. 
 64.  Id. at 369–71. 
 65.  Id. at 373–74. 
 66.  Id. at 374. 
 67.  Id. at 373–74. 
 68.  For a debate over the scope of the anti-corruption principle, see Seth Barrett Tillman, 
Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 1 (2012); Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption, 107 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 30 (2012); Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign 
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The concept of dependency is important in Teachout’s theory. The 
trouble with improper dependence, as I read Teachout’s account, is 
that it gives rise to corruption. Teachout defines one kind of political 
corruption as “public decisions to serve private wealth made because 
of dependent relationships.”69 That is, corruption takes place when 
public officials make public decisions that serve the private ends of 
wealthy people. The corrupt act is the use of public power for private 
ends. These public officials serve the interests of the wealthy people 
because they are “dependent,” i.e., they have received money from 
these wealthy people. The dependency of the public officials on the 
wealthy people is what gives rise to the corrupt act. Th dependency, 
ishowever, does not have to be financial because the benefit could be 
the offer of government offices and presidential appointments.70 
As an example of dependency, Teachout refers to the problem of a 
wealthy man buying off public officials. Although a wealthy man 
“might be tempted to create dependent Senators,” it would be too 
difficult for that man “to buy off enough of [the] members” of the 
Senate, House, Judiciary and Presidency.71 To use this example as an 
illustration, the bought-off Senators would be “dependent” on the 
wealthy man. This dependency is worrisome because the Senators 
would likely engage in corrupt decision-making by serving the private 
interests of the wealthy man instead of serving the public interest. In 
another example, the Presidential Emoluments Clause was designed 
to “prevent the President from becoming overly dependent upon 
Congress (and thereby corrupted by them) or a particular state.”72 
Once again, it seems as though the dependency gives rise to the 
corruption—the President would be “thereby corrupted” as a result of 
the financial dependency on Congress. It could be that corruption (i.e. 
the use of public power for private ends) necessarily follows from 
improper dependence, but it is unclear to me why the improper 
dependence is corruption. 
By contrast, Lessig seems to be saying that “corruption is the 
improper dependence.”73 Dependence corruption takes place when 
 
Emoluments Clause: A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
180 (2012); Zephyr Teachout, Closing Statement, Constitutional Purpose and the Anti-
Corruption Principle, 108 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 200 (2014).  
 69.  Teachout, supra note 7, at 373–74 (emphasis added). 
 70.  Id. at 364. 
 71.  Id. at 381. 
 72.  Id. at 365. 
 73.  In an amicus brief for McCutcheon v. FEC, Lessig writes that the “Framers had a very 
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the government has become dependent on an influence other than 
the people alone. The government has become dependent on the 
funders who only constitute 0.05 percent of the population, and this 
improper dependence conflicts with the dependence on the people 
alone.74 Lessig admits that although corruption for the Framers 
included “our modern sense of individual corruption—the abuse of 
public office for private gain,” it also included an understanding of 
corruption at the level of the institution.75 This institutional sense of 
corruption is dependence corruption. The corruption seems to lie in 
the conflict itself—the conflict between improper and proper 
dependence.76 Lessig writes that “the way we fund elections has 
created a dependency that conflicts with the dependency intended by 
the Constitution. That conflict is a corruption.”77 
I am puzzled by Lessig’s description of the “use of public power 
for private ends” idea as being about individual corruption in sharp 
distinction to dependence corruption, which is about institutional 
corruption. Corruption, understood as the use of public office for 
private ends, was not an exclusively individual concept for republican 
theorists including the Framers; it was institutional as well.78 For 
philosophers such as Locke, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Rousseau 
among others, corruption (understood as the use of public power for 
private ends) existed not only at the individual level but also at a 
systemic institutional and societal level.79 Indeed, they believed that 
an entire society and government could collapse because of 
 
specific conception of the term “corruption” in mind, one at odds with McCutcheon’s more 
modern understanding of that term. For the Framers, “corruption” predicated of institutions as 
well as individuals, and when predicated of institutions, was often constituted by an “improper 
dependence.” Brief of Amicus Curiae of Professor Lawrence Lessig in Support of Appellee at 2, 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, No. 12-563 (July 25, 2013). 
 74.  Lessig, Originalist, supra note 45, at 6. 
 75.  Id. at 7. 
 76.  Lessig writes that the independence of Congress (understood as a dependence on the 
people alone): 
[G]ets corrupted when a conflicting dependency develops within Congress. A 
dependency that draws Congress away from the dependence that was intended. A 
dependency that makes Congress less responsive to the people, because more 
responsive to it. In this second sense of corruption, it is not individuals who are 
corrupted within a well-functioning institution. It is instead an institution that has 
been corrupted, because the pattern of influence operating upon individuals within 
that institution draws them away from the influence intended.  
LESSIG, supra note 5, at 231. 
 77.  Lessig, Originalist, supra note 45, at 6. 
 78.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison) (assessing the possible corruption of the 
Senate, state legislatures, House of Representatives, and the people at large). 
 79.  Dobel, supra note 21, at 959–64. 
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corruption.80 This threat of a republic collapsing because of corruption 
was one of the central challenges that Madison faced when designing 
the Constitution.81 
I also find it puzzling that Lessig has divorced dependence 
corruption from the “use of public power for private ends” 
understanding of corruption—an understanding that is evident in 
Teachout’s discussion of dependency and that is also a core feature of 
the Framers’ approach to corruption and the republican tradition 
more broadly. By equating corruption with improper dependence, 
Lessig seems to have excluded a long tradition that has defined 
individual and institutional corruption as “the use of public power for 
private ends.” It seems to me that an improper dependence (on the 
funders) does not constitute corruption itself but instead gives rise to 
corruption, in the same way that the intended dependence (on the 
people alone) serves a bulwark against corruption.82 Lessig may have 
excluded “the use of public power for private ends” from his 
definition of dependence corruption because he wishes to 
characterize the institution, and not the public officials working in the 
institution, as corrupt. Yet this characterization of corruption is based 
on a distinctively modern post-Foucaultian understanding of human 
agency. Given the centrality of the “use of public office from private 
ends” concept within the Framers’ understanding of systemic 
institutional corruption, Lessig needs to explain why dependence 
corruption does not contain this key aspect of corruption. 
My second question is about the “wrong” at issue in dependence 
corruption. According to Lessig, the problem with dependence 
corruption is that the people have influence “only after the funders of 
campaigns have exercised their influence first.”83 This prior influence 
of the funders leads to the following problems: 
 
 80.  According to the republican tradition, the wealthy and powerful subvert public office 
in order to protect themselves from the envy of the lower classes. In response, the 
disempowered majority lose their loyalty to the community and act selfishly to gain what they 
can. Ordinary citizens mistrust the political system so severely that they cease to voluntarily 
support the primary structures of governance or to make any commitments to the common 
welfare. The factional conflict eventually engulfs the government itself. The relationship 
between the wealthy and the poor disintegrates into violence and polarization, leading to a 
cycling between demagogic and anarchical popular uprisings, on the one hand, and autocratic 
control, on the other.  
 81.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 82.  It may be the case that the term “improper dependence” was sometimes used as a 
shorthand for “corruption,” since such a dependence created the motivation and opportunity 
for the subversion of public power. 
 83.  Lessig, Reply to Hasen, supra note 53, at 4. 
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[A] reasonable citizen could reasonably believe that the 
candidates have become distracted. The reasons for an ordinary 
citizen (who is not also a large funder) to engage with his 
government have been weakened. The influence of the ordinary 
citizen [is] diminished. The dynamic of representative 
government—in which representatives are responsive to all 
citizens—has been undermined by a system that makes 
representatives responsive to funders first, and only then to 
citizens. This is a plain corruption of the system of influence the 
Framers intended.84 
This explanation, though shedding helpful light on dependence 
corruption, raises additional questions. As a start, the idea that the 
undermining of the dynamic of representative government is “a plain 
corruption of the system of influence the Framers intended” may be 
true, but here Lessig seems to be using the word “corruption” in a 
somewhat different way than political corruption. This different usage 
is also evident in his characterization of the conflict between the 
intended dependence on the people and the improper dependence on 
the funders as amounting to “a corruption.”85 Corruption in Lessig’s 
usage means something like corruption as “decay” or 
“degeneration.”86 Whereas the concepts of decay and degeneration 
were associated with a more general definition of “corruption,” as 
Teachout explains, this usage is not the same as “political corruption” 
as understood by the Framers, which had as its central idea the use of 
public power for private gain.87 
Lessig writes that representative government “has been 
undermined by a system that makes representatives responsive to 
funders first, and only then to citizens.”88 Dependence corruption has 
undermined the dynamic of representative government “in which 
representatives are responsive to all citizens.”89 (As an aside, it is 
unlikely that the Framers intended the representative system to be 
responsive to all citizens.90) Although it is true that the Framers 
 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Lessig, Originalist, supra note 45, at 6 (emphasis added). 
 86.  In his presentation at the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy spring 
2014 symposium, Professor Lessig relied on the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of 
“corruption” as involving erosion from a pristine state.  
 87.  Teachout, supra note 7, at 373.  
 88.  Lessig, Reply, supra note 53, at 4. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See Bruce Cain, Is Dependence Corruption the Solution to America’s Campaign 
Finance Problem? 102 CALIF. L. REV. 37, 40 (2014). 
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intended for citizens to have the power to boot officials from office 
via elections, it is not evident that the Framers intended that 
representatives would be responsive on policy matters to all 
citizens.91) The system of representation is also undermined because 
citizens may reasonably be worried that the candidates have become 
“distracted” because these candidates are preoccupied with the 
wishes of the funders. Indeed, the problem is that the “influence of the 
ordinary citizen [is] diminished”—an argument that seems close to a 
level-the-playing-field approach. 
It seems, then, that the “wrong” of dependence corruption is a 
deep-seated concern about the structure of representation. On this 
view, the wrong of dependence corruption is that it violates the 
principle of representation. Guy-Uriel Charles argues, for instance, 
that “dependence corruption is best understood as a problem of 
political participation and not a problem of corruption.”92 Charles 
notes that dependence corruption is not necessarily an equality 
problem because “Lessig is concerned that the state has delegated a 
public function, the financing of campaigns, to private parties, which 
have in turn created a barrier for political participation, wealth, that 
some citizens will never be able to overcome.”93 Though Lessig agrees 
with Charles that dependence corruption “is a problem of 
representation,”94 Lessig states that dependence corruption is “also a 
corruption problem, and there’s no reason it can’t be both.”95 In 
addition, Lessig argues that the negative effects on representation 
should be viewed as the consequences of dependence corruption, not 
the wrong of dependence corruption. 
The difficulty, though, is pinpointing the “wrong” of dependence 
corruption as a “wrong” about corruption.96 Lessig’s definition of 
 
 91.  According to Madison, the device of representation “refine[s] and enlarge[s] the public 
views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may 
best discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be 
least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 50 
(James Madison). Rather than simply implementing the wishes of their constituents, 
representatives are charged with distilling the disparate interests of the people until the public 
good is discovered. See Bernard Manin, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
94 (1997) for a discussion of the “aristocratic effect” of Madisonian representative government. 
 92.  Charles, supra note 42, at 8. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professors Cain and Charles, 102 CALIF. L. REV 49, 51 
(2014). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Guy-Uriel Charles points out that there are at least three definitions of dependence 
corruption. Charles, supra note 42, at 3. 
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improper dependence does not contain within it a key ingredient of 
corruption according to the Framers—namely the use of public power 
for private ends. Without the Framers’ key ingredient, I am not sure 
that dependence corruption amounts to an originalist understanding 
of corruption. Nor does dependence corruption contain within it an 
understanding of corruption that involves a violation of equality. Nor 
is dependence corruption co-extensive with bribery and quid pro quo 
corruption. 
Dependence corruption—understood either as an improper 
dependence (on the funders) or as the conflict between the intended 
dependence (on the people alone) and the improper dependence (on 
the funders)—is principally about a set of relationships between 
public officials, funders, and citizens. In its current form, this set of 
relationships (which is another way of saying, this system of 
representation) gives rise to the problem of corruption. Dependence 
corruption is a very important theory for understanding the 
pathologies of the system of representation. Although Lessig 
characterizes representational harms as the consequences of 
dependence corruption rather than the wrongs of dependence 
corruption, it could be the case that we can recognize a new wrong of 
corruption, namely, that corruption consists of the subversion of 
representation. Putting aside these conceptual questions, there is no 
doubt that the pathologies of the system of representation are 
crucially important to remedy, which is why Lessig’s scholarly work is 
so essential. 
II.  QUID PRO QUO CORRUPTION 
In Buckley v. Valeo,97 the Court struck down the restrictions on 
spending in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) on the basis 
that such limits constituted direct restraints on speech in violation of 
the First Amendment.98 By contrast, the Court upheld FECA’s 
restrictions on contributions on the basis that such limits prevented 
corruption and the appearance of corruption.99 The Court did not 
define either corruption or the appearance of corruption. Instead, it 
declared that unlimited contributions are corrupting when they “are 
given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential 
 
 97.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 98.  Id. at 19–20. 
 99.  Id.  
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office holders.”100 The Court described a political quid pro quo as 
including, but also extending beyond, the act of bribery.101 Laws 
criminalizing bribery “deal with only the most blatant and specific 
attempts of those with money to influence governmental action.”102 
Corruption as political quid pro quo involves more than simple 
bribery, but the Court has struggled to consistently define this extra 
conceptual space. For instance, in FEC v. National Conservative 
Political Action Committee,103 the Court stated that “[c]orruption is a 
subversion of the political process.”104 Corruption subverts the 
democratic process because elected officials “are influenced to act 
contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain 
to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns.”105 The 
Court stated that the “hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro 
quo: dollars for political favors.”106 
Why is quid pro quo corruption wrong? It might help to first 
consider why bribery is wrong. Bribery has a relatively simple 
structure: 
    A citizen gives: cash or other private benefit 
    A citizen receives: a political outcome (particular 
  action taken or avoided) 
    A public official provides:     a political outcome 
    A public official receives:     a private benefit such as cash 
What makes bribery wrong is that a public official is using her 
office to obtain a private benefit. Specifically, public officials use their 
offices to enrich themselves; that is, they convert “public office into 
private wealth.”107 Bribery is wrong because it involves an abuse of 
public power for private gain. The private gain belongs to the official. 
This is the first kind of corruption—corruption as an abuse or misuse 
of power. 
Bribery is wrong for a second reason. It is wrong because those 
citizens who provide bribes are rewarded with special and 
 
 100.  Id. at 26–27. 
 101.  Id. at 27–28. 
 102.  Id.. 
 103.  470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
 104.  Id. at 497. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Strauss, supra note 27, at 1373. 
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disproportionate responsiveness from government as compared to 
those citizens who do not provide bribes. Interestingly enough, the 
Court in Buckley described bribery by focusing on the inequality 
aspect and not on the illicit private gain aspect. According to the 
Court, bribery is the most blatant example of “those with money 
[attempting] to influence governmental action.”108 
Quid pro quo corruption is often described by the shorthand “cash 
for votes” exchange. One difficulty with this shorthand approach is 
that it truncates the transaction by only focusing on one side of the 
equation: a citizen gives a donation and receives a political favor. We 
should also consider the gain achieved by the elected official. For this 
reason, I think it is helpful to consider both sides of the equation: 
 A private donor gives: a campaign donation 
 A private donor receives: a political outcome 
 A public official provides: a political outcome 
 A public official receives: political gain in the form 
  of an electoral support or win 
Is it the private donor’s private interest that is the problem? Or is 
it the public official’s private interest that is the problem? If we focus 
on the private donor, then quid pro quo corruption is wrong because 
it provides the donor special and disproportionate responsiveness 
from government as compared to those citizens who do not donate to 
the official’s campaign. This is the equivalent of corruption as 
inequality. The wrong is that the equal right to participate in the 
political process has been undermined. 
If we focus on the public official, then quid pro quo corruption is 
wrong arguably because she is converting her public office into 
political gain. This is close to corruption as the use of public power for 
private gain but one important difference, as David Strauss points out, 
is that the gain by the public official is political rather than private.109 
This issue will be discussed further in Part IV. 
The more immediate observation to be made is that even quid pro 
quo corruption—which at this moment is the only kind of corruption 
recognized by a majority of the Court as a sufficiently important 
governmental interest to override the First Amendment—has an 
equality aspect to it. The difficulty, of course, is that the Court in 
 
 108.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1976). 
 109.  Strauss, supra note 27, at 1372. 
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Buckley disavowed equality as a relevant government interest. In 
Buckley the Court rejected an equalization rationale, stating in a key 
phrase that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of 
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of 
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”110 Granted, the 
equality at issue in quid pro quo corruption is not level-the-playing 
field equality. Instead it is inequality of legislative responsiveness to 
constituent concerns. That being said, a central conceptual difficulty 
with the Court’s position in Buckley is that one of the wrongs of quid 
pro quo corruption is that citizens who donate large amounts to 
elected officials exert greater political influence when they request 
certain favors than they otherwise would do in the absence of such 
donations. 
III.  CORRUPTION AS INEQUALITY 
Corruption as a violation of the principle of political equality has 
at least seven forms. The inequality may rest in: (1) the capacity of 
citizens to speak; (2) the capacity of citizens to be heard; (3) the 
capacity of candidates and political parties to speak; (4) the capacity 
of candidates and political parties to be heard; (5) citizens’ access to 
representatives; (6) the ability of constituents to influence public 
officials; or (7) the responsiveness of government policy to constituent 
wishes. Many of these forms of inequality have been at issue at one 
time or another in the Court’s campaign finance cases. 
A. Anti-Distortion 
The slippage between corruption (understood as the use of public 
power for private ends) and corruption (understood as a violation of 
equality) became more pronounced in the Court’s cases after Buckley. 
As early as 1982, the Court noted that “substantial aggregations of 
wealth” could be translated into unequal political influence.111 In FEC 
v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,112 the Court observed that the 
“corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth”113 may make 
“a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power 
of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.”114 
 
 110.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49. 
 111.  See FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982). 
 112.  479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
 113.  Id. at 257. 
 114.  Id. at 258. 
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Profit seeking corporations pose a danger of distortion because of the 
“potential for unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes.”115 
The resources available to a corporation “are not an indication of 
popular support for the corporation’s political ideals.”116 
A few years later, in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of 
Commerce,117 the Court recognized a new kind of corruption distinct 
from quid pro quo corruption.118 This new kind of corruption arises as 
a result of the “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the 
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s 
support for the corporation’s political ideals.”119 In Nixon v. Shrink 
Missouri Government PAC,120 Justice Breyer in a concurring opinion 
stated that “[in] limiting the size of the largest contributions, such 
restrictions aim to democratize the influence that money itself may 
bring to bear upon the electoral process.”121 
The Court’s understanding of corruption broadened to include a 
commitment to anti-distortion. The anti-distortion rationale was at 
base a concern about equality, and in particular a concern about 
leveling the electoral playing field. The problem, as David Cole notes, 
is that concentrated wealth gives “certain voices inordinate influence, 
not because of the power of their ideas, but because of the volume 
they can generate for their voices with dollars earned through 
commercial activities.”122 Hence, the Court’s anti-corruption 
justification is “simply a repackaging of the equalization goal.”123 
B. Undue Influence 
The “undue influence” approach to corruption, while also a 
concern about equality, has a slightly different emphasis than Austin’s 
leveling the playing field rationale. Instead of focusing on the 
unrepresentative nature of corporate speech and its potential effect 
on electoral outcomes, the main issue is the effects of the donation on 
 
 115.  Id. at 259. 
 116.  Id. at 258. 
 117.  Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 118.  Id. at 659–60. 
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t. PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 121.  Id. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 122.  David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign 
Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 266 (1991). 
 123.  Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 
SUP. CT. REV. 105, 109. 
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the judgment and decision-making of the legislators. 
In McConnell v. FEC,124 a five-member majority upheld the soft 
money and issue advertising provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). The Court expanded the definition of 
corruption beyond “cash-for-votes exchanges”125 to encompass the 
“undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance 
of such influence.”126 The majority stated that “[j]ust as troubling to a 
functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the 
danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the 
desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those 
who have made large financial contributions valued by the 
officeholder.”127 According to the Court, undue influence was 
apparent in the way that political parties sold special access to 
officeholders.128 By selling access to officeholders, political parties 
created the perception that “money buys influence.”129 The Court 
asserted that even if the sale of access did not secure actual influence, 
it gave rise to the appearance of undue influence.130 The undue 
influence standard triggers both corruption as inequality and 
corruption as an abuse or misuse of power. The wrong of undue 
influence from an equality perspective is that elected officials are 
disproportionately responsive to the wishes of large donors as 
compared to other constituents. Undue influence is also wrong 
because public power is being used to forward the private interests of 
large donors instead of the public interest. 
The Court has recognized that preventing the appearance of 
corruption is also an important governmental interest. Richard Hasen 
helpfully describes this interest as the “public confidence” interest.131 
It stands for the idea that if “the public believes that large donors are 
bribing candidates, large donors have undue influence over 
candidates/elected officials, large donors have unfair access to 
candidates/elected officials, or large donors have disproportionate 
influence over the outcome of elections, the public could lose 
 
 124.  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).  
 125.  Id. at 143. 
 126.  Id. at 150.  
 127.  Id. at 153. 
 128.  Id. at 151. 
 129.  Id. at 154. 
 130.  See id. at 153–54. 
 131.  Richard L. Hasen, Super Pac Contributions, Corruption, and the Proxy War Over 
Coordination, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2014). 
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confidence in the fairness of the electoral process.”132 Hasen also 
identifies three additional interests at stake in individual contribution 
limits: the antibribery interest, the anti-undue influence interest, and 
the equality interest.133 
C. Equality on Hold 
A majority of the Court significantly narrowed the definition of 
corruption in Citizens United.134 The majority struck down provisions 
of BCRA that prevented corporations and unions from making 
independent expenditures from their general treasury funds to 
support or oppose candidates for political office.135 The majority held 
that the only governmental interest strong enough to overcome First 
Amendment concerns is preventing quid pro quo corruption or the 
appearance thereof.136 In a marked departure from McConnell, the 
majority held that “[i]ngratiation and access, in any event, are not 
corruption.”137 In addition, independent expenditures, in the absence 
of prearrangement and coordination, do not give rise to quid pro quo 
corruption nor do they create the appearance of corruption.138 
The majority also overturned the Austin decision, thus rejecting 
the antidistortion rationale. According to Justice Kennedy, Austin’s 
antidistortion rationale was an equalization rationale that was 
inconsistent with Buckley’s central tenet that the First Amendment 
prevents government from restricting the speech of some in order to 
enhance the voice of others.139 As Richard Hasen argues, the Court’s 
new position is in tension with prior decisions which had justified 
contribution limits on a broader understanding of corruption.140 The 
antidistortion argument “did not deserve to be orphaned, and remains 
. . . a key animating principle in thinking about the desirability of 
campaign finance laws.”141 The Court confirmed its hostility to 
 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 2–3. 
 134.  Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
581 (2011) [hereinafter Hasen, Illusion]. 
 135.  Citizens United v FEC, 130 S. Ct 876, 913 (2010). 
 136.  Id. at 909. 
 137.  Id. at 910. 
 138.  Id. at 909–10.  
 139.  Id. at 904 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49). 
 140.  Hasen, Illusion, supra note 134, at 616. 
 141.  Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 989, 990 (2011). 
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equality arguments in Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett,142 by 
striking down a law that provided matching funds to publicly financed 
candidates on the grounds that the law impermissibly leveled the 
playing field in violation of the First Amendment.143 In short, as James 
Gardner observes, the Court has adopted an anti-regulatory 
absolutism in the campaign finance arena.144 
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a 
detailed analysis of McCutcheon v. FEC,145 it is worth mentioning that 
the meaning of corruption was central to the Court’s decision to strike 
down federal limits on aggregate contributions.146 The plurality 
opinion reprised the narrow definition of corruption announced in 
Citizens United. It stated that any regulation of political speech must 
only “target what we have called ‘quid pro quo’ corruption or its 
appearance.”147 Quid pro quo corruption “captures the notion of a 
direct exchange of an official act for money.”148 The plurality also 
confined the appearance of corruption to the appearance of quid pro 
quo corruption.149 Indeed, the plurality explicitly rejected the idea that 
the appearance of influence or access could amount to the 
appearance of corruption.150 In sum, a majority of the Court has not 
only rejected equality-based arguments for campaign finance 
regulations, it has also narrowed the definition of corruption to 
something akin to bribery. 
IV.  CORRUPTION AS AN ABUSE OF POWER 
The challenges presented by corruption as an abuse power are 
highly complex and difficult to resolve. This Part discusses the 
following three challenges: (1) the distinction between acceptable and 
corrupt political gain; (2) the distinction between the public interest 
and the private interest; and, (3) the distinction between acceptable 
and corrupt legislative responsiveness. The upshot of these challenges, 
 
 142.  131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 143.  Id. at 2813. 
 144.  James A. Gardner, Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens 
United and the Implied Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 673, 675 (2011).  
 145.  McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). The decision was handed down shortly 
before this Article was sent to press. 
 146.  The result reached by a four-member plurality of the Court was joined by Justice 
Thomas in his concurring opinion.  
 147.  Id. at 2. 
 148.  Id. at 2–3. 
 149.  Id. at 19. 
 150.  Id.  
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I suggest, is that it is very difficult to distinguish corrupt democratic 
activity from non-corrupt democratic activity. Because of the 
conceptual overlap between public power-based corruption 
arguments and equality-based corruption arguments, these challenges 
would also apply to some forms of corruption as inequality. 
A. The Pursuit of Political Gain 
We often speak of corruption as involving the use of public office 
for “personal or political gain,” but it is important to retain a 
distinction between personal gain and political gain. As David Strauss 
observes, there is an important difference between bribery and 
corruption.151 Bribery involves the use of public office for personal 
non-political gain. By contrast, quid pro quo corruption involves the 
use of public office for political gain. The public official receives a 
campaign donation, and in exchange, provides a political outcome 
sought by the donor. The public official is motivated by political gain; 
specifically, the prospect of re-election.152 An elected representative’s 
chance of getting re-elected is helped by campaign contributions 
because these contributions can be used to pay for electoral 
advertising. 
This distinction is similar to the distinction drawn by Dennis 
Thompson between individual corruption and institutional 
corruption.153 Individual corruption refers to bribery, extortion, and 
simple personal gain. Institutional corruption takes place when “the 
gain a member receives is political rather than personal, the service 
the member provides is procedurally improper, and the connection 
between the gain and the service has a tendency to damage the 
legislature or the democratic process.”154 
Although the pursuit of political gain is self-interested, it is not 
necessarily a wrong. Indeed, the difficulty posed by corruption is that 
it consists of the same mechanism that undergirds democratic 
accountability. As Strauss argues, it is not necessarily a bad thing for 
an official to use “the power of her office, not for personal 
enrichment, but in order to remain in office longer.”155 According to 
 
 151.  Strauss, supra note 27, at 1372. 
 152.  Id. at 1373. 
 153.  DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL 
CORRUPTION 7 (1995) [hereinafter THOMPSON, ETHICS]. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Strauss, supra note 27, at 1373. 
DAWOOD 8.13.14 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/2015  4:37 PM 
2014] CLASSIFYING CORRUPTION 129 
the Framers, the desire of elected officials to get re-elected will 
provide a safeguard against these officials abusing their power.156 In 
other words, elected officials are supposed to be motivated by the 
prospect of political gain. Elected officials acting for political gain is 
not the problem; indeed, it is meant to be the solution to the problem 
of public officials not acting in the public interest. 
It is very difficult, however, to identify the point at which the use 
of public office for political gain transforms into corruption. This is 
because corrupt activity overlaps with conduct that is expected in 
politics.157 According to Thompson, what makes certain conduct 
corrupt is that “it violates principles that promote the distinctive 
purposes of the institution.”158 One possibility is that we can recognize 
corruption when the public interest is taken over by private interests. 
This approach begs the question: What is the public interest? 
B. The Public Interest and Private Interests 
The next conceptual puzzle involves the problem of the public 
interest. How do we know what the public interest entails? Is the 
public interest always separate from private interests? Or is the public 
interest just a collection of private interests? If the political process 
produces a private output, does this constitute corruption? The 
proceduralist approach holds that the public interest is the outcome 
that is arrived at through a legitimate decision-making process. A 
legitimate decision-making process is one in which all persons 
affected by the decision ought to have an equal right to participate in 
the process. Yet there are two main ways in which we can conceive of 
this participation. These two approaches are the aggregative and 
deliberative models of democracy.159 
Under the aggregative model, citizens’ preferences are identified, 
aggregated, and translated into a selection of laws.160 A key idea is that 
the democratic process must accord equal consideration to the 
interests of each citizen. The role of the state is to employ a neutral 
device, such as majority rule, to transform citizen preferences into 
policy. By contrast, under the deliberative model, citizens and public 
 
 156.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison). 
 157.  THOMPSON, ETHICS, supra note 153, at 7. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  The following discussion is drawn from Yasmin Dawood, Second-Best Deliberative 
Democracy and Election Law, 12 ELECTION L.J. 401 (2013). 
 160.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 7 (2001).  
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officials engage in deliberation to determine which laws should be 
adopted. Policies are chosen on the basis that they are supported by 
the best reasons. The deliberative account differs from the aggregative 
account in a crucial respect because it holds that individuals’ 
judgments may not be motivated by self-interest. Thus, the 
aggregative account is associated with self-interested preferences 
while the deliberative account is associated with public-regarding 
judgments. The state must ensure that all those affected by the 
decision-making are included in the deliberation on equal terms.161 
The upshot is that on the aggregative account, the public interest 
can consist of those private preferences that have been approved 
through a neutral mechanism such as a majority vote. The fact that 
private citizen preferences have been enacted into law is not on its 
own evidence of corruption. For Thompson, private interests become 
legitimated through the democratic process by the process of 
deliberation.162 That is, private interests can be transformed into public 
purposes provided that these private interests are subjected to the 
democratic process.163 By contrast, private interests contaminate the 
public interest when they influence decision-making outside of the 
democratic process.164 These private interests are corruptive because 
they have not gone through the democratic process.165 
On this view, corruption takes place when private interests have 
not been subjected to the democratic process. The difficulty is that 
private (or special) interests are routinely subjected to the democratic 
process and have been enacted into law.166 It is very difficult to 
distinguish this kind of corruption from the ordinary political process 
in which private interests are transformed into the public interest. 
C. Legislative Independence and Legislative Responsiveness 
How independent should legislative decision-making be from 
constituent wishes? Or as Hanna Pitkin put it, “[s]hould (must) a 
representative do what his constituents want, and be bound by 
mandates or instructions from them; or should (must) he be free to 
 
 161.  IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 23 (2000). 
 162.  THOMPSON, ETHICS, supra note 153, at 28. 
 163.  Thompson, Concepts, supra note 9, at 1039. 
 164.  THOMPSON, ETHICS, supra note 153, at 28. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Stephen Sachs argues, for instance, that “protecting the government from private 
influence is too diffuse a goal.” Stephen E. Sachs, Corruption, Clients, and Political Machines: A 
Response to Professor Issacharoff, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 62 (2011). 
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act as seems best to him in pursuit of their welfare?”167 
Under the independence (trustee) approach, legislators make 
decisions only based on an objective view of what the public interest 
demands. In other words, the decision should be made only on the 
merits, independently of all other considerations. On this view, any 
influence by constituents would be improper.168 Under the mandate 
approach, by contrast, legislators are responsive to the views of their 
constituents. The question, though, is which constituents should be 
influential? Should the legislator follow all the constituents’ wishes, or 
only a segment of the constituents? As Pamela Karlan and Samuel 
Issacharoff observe, what is required is some theory of what a “clean” 
process would produce in terms of policy outcomes.169 
The ideal position is most likely some combination of 
independence from constituents’ wishes and responsiveness to their 
wishes. Indeed, Pitkin describes a range of in-between options.170 In 
the event the legislator is responsive to her constituents’ wishes, at 
what point does this responsiveness become corruption? Corruption 
arguably takes place when representatives are too closely tied to their 
constituents’ wishes; that is, when there is not enough independent 
judgment.171 The “undue influence” standard in McConnell seems to 
capture the idea that certain kinds of responsiveness amount to 
corruption. The majority described the “danger that officeholders will 
decide issues not on the merits [independence/trustee model] or the 
desires of their constituencies [mandate model].”172 Instead, 
officeholders will decide issues “according to the wishes of those who 
have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”173 
It would seem that satisfying the wishes of large donors is corruptive, 
while satisfying the wishes of constituents is not. Justin Levitt 
describes the problem as follows: “A corporation trades substantial 
expenditures for favorable legislation, which is unremarkable when 
the legislation also benefits the voting constituency, and pernicious 
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 168.  Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 
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when the broader constituency is harmed, particularly if the harm is 
not sufficiently severe to provoke a collective response from the 
broader constituency.”174 As Daniel Lowenstein points out, the 
legislative process is also tainted by the legislator’s conflict of interest 
between serving the constituency and serving his or her own self-
interest to secure campaign funds.175 
At the same time, it is not immediately apparent how political 
responsiveness to constituents who make campaign donations differs 
from good democratic accountability. The key distinction between the 
two seems to be that elected officials are “influenced to act contrary 
to their obligations of office.”176 The inference is that in the absence of 
the campaign donation, the elected official would not have taken the 
particular action to assist the donor. The problem is not that 
legislators are responsive to citizen demands because this 
responsiveness is the hallmark of democratic accountability. Instead, 
the argument is that the legislator would not have met the wishes of 
that particular constituent but-for the donation the legislator received 
from that constituent. 
CONCLUSION 
Corruption is a highly contested concept. The good news is that 
corruption can be defined in any number of ways. The bad news is 
that a majority of the Supreme Court has the final say on where the 
line should be drawn between ordinary democratic politics and 
corruption. The majority’s line-drawing has restricted corruption to a 
very narrow strip of the conceptual landscape. The Court’s approach 
has meant that ordinary democratic politics now occupies space that 
many would describe as “corruption.” 
What ought to be done? One approach, as argued by Deborah 
Hellman, is that the Court should be wary of defining corruption 
because to do so inevitably involves defining democracy—a task that 
the Court has rightly avoided in other election law contexts.177 
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Another approach, defended by Guy-Uriel Charles, is that we should 
resist “corruption temptation,” which he describes as the urge to 
refract all campaign finance issues through the lens of corruption.178 
Instead, we should be talking about the real issue, which is the 
problem of political participation.179 Finally, Richard Hasen argues 
that “the best way to change the First Amendment is to change the 
Supreme Court.”180 He urges that in the meantime, those who believe 
in reasonable campaign finance regulation should be putting together 
equality-based arguments that could convince future justices.181 
Although this Article does not answer Hasen’s call directly, it 
seeks to provide a conceptual map of the concept of corruption, with 
a particular emphasis on the theoretical puzzles and challenges posed 
by corruption. I have argued that there are two main clusters of ideas 
about why corruption is wrong. One cluster of ideas focuses on the 
use of public power for private ends. This approach raises a number of 
thorny conceptual problems about where to draw the line between 
ordinary democratic politics and corruption. The second cluster of 
ideas focuses on the violation of equality, understood in various ways. 
In addition, I have suggested that there is a conceptual connection 
between these two approaches (but only for corruption in a 
democracy), which is why so many forms of corruption can be framed 
either as a violation of the proper use of power or as a violation of 
equality. Even bribery and quid pro quo corruption, I suggest, have 
this dual conceptual structure. One implication of this convergence is 
that some forms of equality-based corruption arguments will be 
vulnerable to the three conceptual challenges associated with public 
power-based corruption arguments. These three challenges are: (1) the 
distinction between acceptable and corrupt political gain; (2) the 
distinction between the public interest and private interests; and (3) 
the distinction between acceptable and corrupt legislative 
responsiveness. Future work in the field could develop standards to 
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